Contextualism, assessor relativism, and insensitive assessments

Recently, contextualism about epistemic modals and predicates of taste have come under fire from advocates of assessment relativistic analyses. Contextualism, they have argued, fails to account for what we call "felicitous insensitive assessments". In this paper, we provide one hitherto overlooked way in which contextualists can embrace the phenomenon by slightly modifying an assumption that has remained in the background in most of the debate over contextualism and relativism. Finally, we briefly argue that the resulting contextualist account is at least as plausible as the relativist alternative and should be carefully considered before contextualism is abandoned for relativism

Transdisciplinarity seen through Information, Communication, Computation, (Inter-)Action and Cognition

Similar to oil that acted as a basic raw material and key driving force of industrial society, information acts as a raw material and principal mover of knowledge society in the knowledge production, propagation and application. New developments in information processing and information communication technologies allow increasingly complex and accurate descriptions, representations and models, which are often multi-parameter, multi-perspective, multi-level and multidimensional. This leads to the necessity of collaborative work between different domains with corresponding specialist competences, sciences and research traditions. We present several major transdisciplinary unification projects for information and knowledge, which proceed on the descriptive, logical and the level of generative mechanisms. Parallel process of boundary crossing and transdisciplinary activity is going on in the applied domains. Technological artifacts are becoming increasingly complex and their design is strongly user-centered, which brings in not only the function and various technological qualities but also other aspects including esthetic, user experience, ethics and sustainability with social and environmental dimensions. When integrating knowledge from a variety of fields, with contributions from different groups of stakeholders, numerous challenges are met in establishing common view and common course of action. In this context, information is our environment, and informational ecology determines both epistemology and spaces for action. We present some insights into the current state of the art of transdisciplinary theory and practice of information studies and informatics. We depict different facets of transdisciplinarity as we see it from our different research fields that include information studies, computability, human-computer interaction, multi-operating-systems environments and philosophy.Comment: Chapter in a forthcoming book: Information Studies and the Quest for Transdisciplinarity - Forthcoming book in World Scientific. Mark Burgin and Wolfgang Hofkirchner, Editor

The Pragmatics of Insensitive Assessments: Understanding The Relativity of Assessments of Judgments of Personal Taste, Epistemic Modals, and More

In assessing the veridicality of utterances, we normally seem to assess the satisfaction of conditions that the speaker had been concerned to get right in making the utterance. However, the debate about assessor-relativism about epistemic modals, predicates of taste, gradable adjectives and conditionals has been largely driven by cases in which seemingly felicitous assessments of utterances are insensitive to aspects of the context of utterance that were highly relevant to the speaker’s choice of words. In this paper, we offer an explanation of why certain locutions invite insensitive assessments, focusing primarily on ‘tasty’ and ‘might’. We spell out some reasons why felicitous insensitive assessments are puzzling and argue briefly that recent attempts to accommodate such assessments (including attempts by John MacFarlane, Kai von Fintel and Anthony Gillies) all fail to provide more than hints at a solution to the puzzle. In the main part of the paper, we develop an account of felicitous insensitive assessments by identifying a number of pragmatic factors that influence the felicity of assessments. Before closing, we argue that the role of these factors extends beyond cases considered in the debate about assessor-relativism and fits comfortably with standard contextualist analyses of the relevant locutions

The Pragmatics of Insensitive Assessments

<p>In assessing the veridicality of utterances, we normally seem to assess the satisfaction of conditions that the speaker had been concerned to get right in making the utterance. However, the debate about assessor-relativism about epistemic modals, predicates of taste, gradable adjectives and conditionals has been largely driven by cases in which seemingly felicitous assessments of utterances are insensitive to aspects of the context of utterance that were highly relevant to the speaker’s choice of words.</p><p>In this paper, we offer an explanation of why certain locutions invite insensitive assessments, focusing primarily on ’tasty’ and ’might’. We spell out some reasons why felicitous insensitive assessments are puzzling and argue briefly that recent attempts to accommodate such assessments (including attempts by John MacFarlane, Kai von Fintel and Anthony Gillies) all fail to provide more than hints at a solution to the puzzle. In the main part of the paper, we develop an account of felicitous insensitive assessments by identifying a number of pragmatic factors that influence the felicity of assessments. Before closing, we argue that the role of these factors extends beyond cases considered in the debate about assessor-relativism and fits comfortably with standard contextualist analyses of the relevant locutions.</p><p><strong>References</strong></p><p>Almér, A. &amp; Björnsson, G. 2009. ‘Relativism, Contextualism and Insensitive Assessments’. Logique et Analyse 52: 363–372.<br /><br />Bach, K. 2011. ‘Perspectives on possibilities: Contextualism, Relativism, or what?’<br /><br />Bennett, J. 2003. A Philosophical Guide to Conditionals. Oxford U. P.<br /><a href="http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/0199258872.001.0001" target="_blank">http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/0199258872.001.0001</a><br /><br />Björnsson, G. 2011. ‘Towards a Radically Pragmatic Theory of If-Conditionals’. 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Bridging Connectionism and Relational Cognition through Bi-directional Affective-Associative Processing

Connectionist architectures constitute a popular method for modelling animal associative learning processes in order to glean insights into the formation of cognitive capacities. Such approaches (based on purely feedforward activity) are considered limited in their ability to capture relational cognitive capacities. Pavlovian learning value-based models, being not based purely on fully connected feedforward structure, have demonstrated learning capabilities that often mimic those of ‘higher’ relational cognition. Capturing data using such models often reveals how associative mechanisms can exploit structure in the experimental setting, so that ‘explicit’ relational cognitive capacities are not, in fact, required. On the other hand, models of relational cognition, implemented as neural networks, permit formation and retrieval of relational representations of varying levels of complexity. The flexible processing capacities of such models are, however, are subject to constraints as to how offline relational versus online (real-time, real-world) processing may be mediated. In the current article, we review the potential for building a connectionist-relational cognitive architecture with reference to the representational rank view of cognitive capacity put forward by Halford et al. Through interfacing system 1-like (connectionist/associative learning) and system 2-like (relational-cognition) computations through a bidirectional affective processing approach, continuity between Halford et al’s cognitive systems may be operationalized according to real world/online constraints. By addressing i) and ii) in this manner, this paper puts forward a testable unifying framework for system 1-like and system 2-like cognition

Vicarious Value Learning and Inference in Human-Human and Human-Robot Interaction

Among the biggest challenges for researchers of human-robot interaction is imbuing robots with lifelong learning capacities that allow efficient interactions between humans and robots. In order to address this challenge we are developing computational mechanisms for a humanoid robotic agent utilizing both system 1 and system 2-like cognitive processing capabilities. At the core of this processing is a Social Affective Appraisal model that allows for vicarious value learning and inference. Using a multi-dimensional reinforcement learning approach the robotic agent learns affective value-based functions (system 1). This learning can ground representations of affective relations (predicates) relevant to interacting agents. In this article we discuss the existing theoretical basis for developing our neural network model as a system 1-like process. We also discuss initial ideas for developing system 2-like top-down/generative affective (semantic relation-based) processing. The aim of the symbolic-connectionist architectural development is to promote autonomous capabilities in humanoid robots for interacting efficiently/intelligently (recombinant application of learned associations) with humans in changing and challenging environments

Tramadol misuse in treatment-seeking adolescents and young adults with problematic substance use – Prediction of treatment retention

Non-medical prescription use of opioids (NMPUO) is a public health concern worldwide. Recently, tramadol misuse is increasing, but the systematic research of misuse of this specific opioid is limited. This study set out to assess the relationship between tramadol use and completion of treatment for substance use among adolescents and adults ≤ 25 years in an outpatient clinical setting. A retrospective cohort study of treatment outcome, expressed as “completion” or “non-completion” of treatment, was conducted in treatment-seeking adolescents with problematic substance use (n = 335). Data was extracted from Ung-DOK interviews, a semi-structured assessment instrument designed for adolescents with substance abuse. The study included all treatment-seeking patients at an out-patient facility in 2014–2017. A total of 26% (n = 88) were tramadol users (life-time prevalence). Twenty percent (n = 66) of all treatments were non-completed. Tramadol users were significantly more likely than non-users to drop out of treatment (35% vs 15%, p < 0.001). In multivariate logistic regression, tramadol use and age 18 and above were factors significantly associated with non-completion. Tramadol use was statistically significantly associated with non-completion of treatment. Further research addressing treatment needs and treatment completion among tramadol users is needed

Affective–associative two-process theory: a neurocomputational account of partial reinforcement extinction effects

The partial reinforcement extinction effect (PREE) is an experimentally established phenomenon: behavioural response to a given stimulus is more persistent when previously inconsistently rewarded than when consistently rewarded. This phenomenon is, however, controversial in animal/human learning theory. Contradictory findings exist regarding when the PREE occurs. One body of research has found a within-subjects PREE, while another has found a within-subjects reversed PREE (RPREE). These opposing findings constitute what is considered the most important problem of PREE for theoreticians to explain. Here, we provide a neurocomputational account of the PREE, which helps to reconcile these seemingly contradictory findings of within-subjects experimental conditions. The performance of our model demonstrates how omission expectancy, learned according to low probability reward, comes to control response choice following discontinuation of reward presentation (extinction). We find that a PREE will occur when multiple responses become controlled by omission expectation in extinction, but not when only one omission-mediated response is available. Our model exploits the affective states of reward acquisition and reward omission expectancy in order to differentially classify stimuli and differentially mediate response choice. We demonstrate that stimulus–response (retrospective) and stimulus–expectation–response (prospective) routes are required to provide a necessary and sufficient explanation of the PREE versus RPREE data and that Omission representation is key for explaining the nonlinear nature of extinction data